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Abstract: The subject of this paper is the analysis of the classification of economic systems. The tra-
ditional classifications of capitalist, socialist centrally planned, and socialist market 
systems, and the newer classification of variants of capitalism into the Anglo-Saxon, Eu-
ropean continental, and Asian models, are inadequate to explain new phenomena in a 
globalized economy. After the collapse of central planning, countries in transition became 
a category describing processes of deep socio-economic transformation. These transition 
countries aspired to meet the standards of developed European market economies, as well 
as governance standards regarding democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. A new 
classification of economic systems by Balcerowicz (2014) combines the traditional classifi-
cation of economic systems with the characteristics of well-governed democratic societies 
in order to come up with a matrix that shows the interaction of economic system charac-
teristics and governance outcomes.This paper builds on Balcerowicz’s classification by 
introducing and delineating the categories of state capitalism, crony capitalism, and state 
capture in order to provide a new classification of economic systems. It uses these concepts 
to empirically analyze the transition countries, with special reference to states aspiring to 
EU membership and the new EU member states. The methodology used is analytical and 
empirical. The results find that the transition is incomplete, especially in  terms of govern-
ance, leading to the hypothesis of a ‘mid-transition trap’, similar to the much discussed 
‘middle-income trap’. The results should lead to further, more refined research.
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JEL Classification: D72, P16, P50
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Introduction
The field of comparative economic systems came into being with the theoretical for-
mulation of the possibility of an economically efficient socialist system. The defining 
article that opened up the debate was the famous Barone article (Barone, 1908) on 
the possibility of reaching an efficient equilibrium under a collectivist state. This in-
spired Mises’s critique of socialism (Mises, 1920) and the famous debate on market 
socialism in the 1930s between Lange, Taylor, and Hayek (Lippincott 1956; Vujačić, 
1983). The field grew rapidly and gained in significance with the establishment of 
central planning (in the USSR and other communist states), and, later, market social-
ism (in Yugoslavia). The dividing line during the cold war was between the economic 
systems of capitalism and various forms of socialism. At the same time, capitalism 
was seen as having variants with sharp distinctions, viz. the Anglo-Saxon model, the 
European or Continental model, and the Asian model (Gregory and Stuart, 2014). 
The criteria that delineated these varieties of capitalism were different forms of cor-
porate finance, labor market organization and other institutional arrangements, cor-
porate ownership and control, and social security and welfare models. 
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe followed by the demise of the 
Soviet Union profoundly changed the study of comparative economic systems. The 
major shift was to studying the transition from socialism to a market economy; thus 
the ‘economics of transition’ was born. Most studies of transition were compara-
tive and examined the different paths and varying aspects of transition in different 
countries. For example, they compared different privatization models or analyzed the 
different sequencing of institutional reforms and used these as criteria for assessing 
outcomes in overall macroeconomic performance. However, these types of analysis 
were too simplistic to deal adequately with the deep socioeconomic transformation 
that societies undergo through transition. Initial historical conditions or certain types 
of economic policy were introduced as control variables. 
Since the beginning of the post-communist period there has been a growing interest 
in institutions. The most prominent research on this subject is by Acemoglu and Rob-
inson (2005, 2012). Other noted authors have tried to redefine comparative systems in 
terms of institutional frontiers, institutional clusters, and the new comparative political 
economy (Djankov et al., 2003). The other shift has been to introduce the analysis of in-
stitutions and to focus on GDP growth as a success criterion (Boettke et al. 2005, 2023). 
Prominent academics in the field have criticized the latter approach (Brada, 2009).
Evaluating Economic Systems
The classic comparison of economic systems introduced certain criteria in order 
to evaluate the performance of economic systems by comparing their advantages 
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and disadvantages. The  ‘success criteria’ were the result of broad consensus in the 
field and were supposed to be neutral and normative-free. These included economic 
growth (overall and per capita), stability as a measure of the system’s ability to absorb 
shocks (employment and price stability), equality measured by income distribution, 
sustainability as maintaining the system fundamentals through reforms and chal-
lenges, efficiency measured by productivity and productivity growth, and openness 
as a measure of integration into the world economy (Eckstein, 1973). Other criteria 
(for example, innovation) were added or subtracted depending on the emphasis of the 
research.
 Although the scientific goal was neutral and value-free criteria, in fact the criteria 
were normative in character. The tentativeness of these ‘success criteria’ can be easily 
demonstrated. For example, if the researcher ascribes different weights to the criteria 
when comparing concrete systems the result will inevitably be subjective and reflect 
their normative judgment. This basic fact cannot be denied, in spite of the broad con-
sensus and the fact that these criteria reflect widely held social and economic goals 
in the analyzed economies.  Nevertheless, the criteria were useful, in spite of the fact 
that in most cases the theoretical analysis could a priori predict the outcome of com-
parisons of certain criteria with almost complete accuracy. For example, it was not 
difficult to predict that the socialist system would be more egalitarian than the capi-
talist market system in terms of income distribution, even after taking the privileges 
of the communist nomenklatura into account.
The need for new criteria for evaluating and classifying economic systems aris-
es from several deep structural shifts in the world economy. The first is the fall of 
communism in Europe and the new transition experience. There is great variation in 
the distance between transitioning countries and a fully fledged market economy and 
in the time that they take to get there. As will be demonstrated later, this transition 
is not fully complete and needs to be analyzed in terms of the characteristics of the 
economic system. Another reason is globalization, the rise of emerging markets, and 
the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis. The latter has profoundly undermined 
the consensus view of the basic superiority of the Anglo Saxon model in terms of 
economic growth and efficiency. Thus, the question is: What criteria, old or new, 
should we use to assess economic systems? 
New Criteria for Evaluating Economic Systems
When considering new criteria to assess economic systems, the recent work of Bal-
cerowicz (2014) represents a landmark. It focuses on judging the success of economic 
systems through an explicitly normative approach: the criteria used to determine 
the characteristics of a ‘good life’ are those which the West has historically defined, 
stemming from the values the West proclaims to hold dear, including human rights, 
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political freedom, economic freedom, and a certain level of social welfare and social 
rights. The first three are correlated with the rule of law, while the fourth has to do 
with types of institutional solidarity. Can these values and the measurement of their 
attainment be used as  ‘success criteria’ for economic systems?
Several fundamentally important questions immediately come to mind. Why  sub-
stitute the traditional success criteria listed above with an alternative set of criteria? 
In other words, is it not the goal of economic systems to provide economic prosperity 
through economic growth, rising per capita income, stability, and equality? Secondly, 
in using the measurement of  quality of life through political rights, human rights, the 
rule of law, and social welfare, the   abandonment of  the focus on the character and 
major traits of economic systems? Thirdly, is this not confusing the characteristics 
of developed capitalist economies as an end in itself with the characteristics of de-
veloped capitalist economies as a means to prosperity? Are they not themselves the 
result of economic development and prosperity? These questions need to be answered 
in a straightforward fashion.
In answer to the first question, it should be kept in mind that universal Western 
values have been a source of legitimacy not just in their place of origin but also in 
the revolutionary ideology of Marxism. Marx asserted that true human freedom 
and rights would be genuinely achieved after the establishment of a socialist sys-
tem and that bourgeois rights are only a sham. Therefore, emancipation was part of 
Marxist doctrine and in some respects of Marxist practice. Secondly, the collapse 
of communism was followed by the inauguration of not just a transition to a capi-
talist economy but also to democracy as a political system. Finally, the perceived 
neglect of elements of the economic system, its structure, and its functioning can 
be dealt with by clustering the main models of the market economy, thus paving the 
way for subdivisions and further analysis. These models and sub-models can then 
be judged by the level of attainment of the core values defined as success criteria. 
In other words, the clusters will give us the common elements of economic sys-
tems, which can then be related to the criteria discussed. The debate as to whether 
economic development causes democracy in the historical evolution of capitalism 
or vice versa will certainly continue, probably with mixed results, but it is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, two themes are important for this discussion. One relates to the 
major traits of the economic system and how they affect the values associated with 
democracy (human rights, political and economic freedom). Do the characteristics 
of the economic system enhance these values or do they diminish them? The other 
question is why the adoption of Western institutions in the transition process did not 
enable a more solid institutional adoption of these proclaimed values. Let us turn to 
the major characteristics of economic systems as related to the criteria that we have 
listed. 
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This is what Balcerowicz had done in his description of the relationships that is 
under   investigation here (Balcerowicz,2014). However, his classification adds some 
new categories, such as overregulated capitalism, crony capitalism, and quasi-social-
ism as types of economic systems. These categories require a more accurate theoret-
ical and empirical specification. Using his categorization as an inspiration, a some-
what different and hopefully enhanced analysis will be developed  by introducing 
new categories of economic systems.
While the category of socialism used here needs no explanation because it is 
basically synonymous with a communist centrally planned system as described in 
the classical comparative systems literature, the others need more specification. The 
easiest one is the quasi-socialism category, in which there is no central planning but 
the dominance of state-owned enterprises is such that there is no substantial market 
economy except for a small business sector. Delineating overregulated and free mar-
ket capitalism boils down to the degree of economic freedom, provided that the po-
litical system is democratic. However, the category of crony capitalism is extremely 
difficult to pin down both theoretically and empirically. 
62 Ivan Vujačić, Jelica Petrović-Vujačić
In terms of the described success criteria, the free market capitalist system and 
the overregulated capitalist system are generally associated with much higher levels 
of democracy and human and political rights, with high levels of public social spend-
ing in the overregulated capitalist system. The other economic systems generally 
score very badly on these criteria, except in most cases the criterion of public social 
spending, which tends to be high. The most obvious weakness in this classification is 
the crony capitalism category, which remains undefined. For this reason, a new, more 
precise classification of economic systems seems appropriate.
A New Classification – New State Capitalism and State Capture
Two big events have shaped the world in the last thirty years. The first is the fall of 
communism in Europe and the transition process to a market economy and West-
ern-style democracy in the former socialist countries. The second is the financial 
crisis of 2008. The first boosted the hegemony of the Western market economic and 
political system. The second resulted in skepticism towards Western capitalism in 
general and the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism in particular, as it was identified 
with the dominance of financial markets as the major driver of investment and the 
main culprit behind the global recession. 
The opposite of the Anglo-Saxon model is the system best described as state capi-
talism, characteristic of some emerging markets. This term has acquired various mean-
ings over a very long period, the discussion of which will be avoided. Instead, the use 
of the term ‘new state capitalism’ as defined by Bremmer (2010) as a system in which 
the political elite does not act to maximize economic prosperity but uses economic 
resources to maximize its power and perpetuate its hold on power, will applied in this 
analysis. To achieve this goal the political elites use sovereign wealth funds, subsidies 
for national champions, and controlling stakes in state-owned enterprises or publicly 
traded corporations. In this system the state has the dominant role in controlling eco-
nomic resources and employment. In essence, it is a new type of mercantilism, in which 
the state helps its businesses penetrate foreign markets not only through subsidies and 
soft loans but also by using political means wherever possible.
The heavy involvement of the state brings back a long-neglected categorization 
of Max Weber (1978, originally1920), who defined aberrations from the ideal type of 
capitalist profit. These were a) predatory, b) obtained through domination and force, 
and c) stemming from closeness to and unusual transactions with political authority. 
In other words, Weber identified ‘political capitalism’ as a category associated with 
the types of profit listed above and separate from the ideal type of capitalism and 
capitalism based on trade (Weber,1978, pp.164-165). With the expansion of new state 
capitalism and the increasing use of the term ‘crony capitalism’, Weber’s concept of 
political capitalism gains in relevance. 
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At first glance these two categories are completely distinct. The category ‘new 
state capitalism’ has already been defined. Crony capitalism, on the other hand, is 
usually loosely defined as a situation in which collusion between business interests 
and political power leads to special privileges and rents which otherwise would not 
exist and which are associated with corruption. The introduction of various types of 
institutional arrangement that privilege businesses without economic justification is 
usually accompanied by some type of quid pro quo for parts of the governing politi-
cal elite. The London Economist (2016) has attempted to measure the extent of crony 
capitalism by constructing a crony capitalism index to rank countries, based on the 
presence of certain industries that are susceptible to monopoly and require licensing 
or are highly dependent on government regulation. 
However, the concept of crony capitalism lacks the differentia specifica that would 
make it useful in defining it as an economic system. The reason is that crony capi-
talism, just like corruption or rent-seeking behavior, will always exist, just as market 
imperfections exist in all countries. Thus, the existence of crony capitalism as a dom-
inant characteristic that defines the economic system becomes a matter of the degree 
of the existence of certain phenomena, measured by a set of agreed upon indicators. 
This is not only extremely difficult, but also somewhat fuzzy. For example, does the 
entrenched and extensive political lobbying in the United States classify its economic 
system as crony capitalist and put it in the same category as Russia? If so, does not 
this category not obscure differences that are so vast as to render the concept of crony 
capitalism meaningless. This does not mean that crony capitalism does not exist, but 
merely that it is a phenomenon present in every system in hugely varying degrees. 
This would mean that another category is needed to describe the differences between 
economic systems, including systems in which crony capitalism is largely present. 
The obvious candidate for the demarcation line is the concept of state capture. 
State capture is often used as synonymous with crony capitalism, but the two should 
be clearly differentiated. Crony capitalism is part of rent-seeking and is gained 
through lobbying, influence, corruption, or other means, but is limited to certain sec-
tors which then gain one-off, mid-term, or longer-term advantages through various, 
mostly legal means (tax breaks, subsidies, licenses, regulation etc). In crony capital-
ism illegal means can also lead to rents (inside information, influencing conditions 
of tenders, etc.). The major difference between crony capitalism and state capture, 
however, does not lie in the legality or illegality of certain actions, but in the partial 
(as opposed to all-encompassing) character of state capture. With all the various dif-
ferent definitions, in our view the concept of state capture should reflect a situation in 
which political power is systematically used on a large scale to more or less perma-
nently abuse institutions in order to provide advantages and rents to the business elite. 
The business elite can either be subservient to the political class or it can dominate 
it. Furthermore, the business and political elites can be intertwined and overlap. The 
importance of this difference with crony capitalism cannot be exaggerated. More to 
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the point, state capture can therefore to a great degree be directly associated with new 
state capitalism.
Starting from here our analysis modifies and expands Balcerowicz’s classifica-
tion of economic systems by introducing the category of new state capitalism as an 
economic system and moving the category of crony capitalism from defining an eco-
nomic system to a characteristic present to varying degrees in all economic systems. 
The category of state capture as a characteristic of economic systems is also includ-
ed. The new classification excludes social spending, as the other values are deemed 
as more important Finally,  a new category of economic system is added : transition 
countries. Before proceeding, some explanation of this category is in order. 
For a long time transition was seen as a phase through which countries pass in 
order to become fully fledged democracies and market economies. The underlying 
theoretical assumption was an optimistically inclined modernization theory that 
came to prominence in the early days of the Cold War: former socialist countries 
would undergo market reforms (stabilization, liberalization, and privatization) and 
introduce supporting institutions (property rights, the rule of law, etc.) that would 
put them on the road to economic growth and development. As communism had col-
lapsed and the long-awaited possibility of establishing a free democratic society had 
arrived, most of these countries would also adopt a democratic system that emulated 
a Western type of democracy. Furthermore, these processes would be encouraged 
by the process of accession to EU membership in those countries that had embarked 
on or completed this path. In short, there would be convergence not only regarding 
market institutions and GDP per capita, but also in regards to democratic institutions 
and governing practices of developed Western European countries. Eventually, in 
spite of some difficulty overcoming initial obstacles (transition recession, resistance 
to reforms by vested interests, etc.), the countries in transition would resemble West-
ern-style democracies and market economies. 
Evaluating Transition
In evaluating transition analysis is confined  to the new EU member states and the 
countries of the Western Balkans aspiring to join the EU, which have been in the 
process of transition for two to three decades. The countries of former Yugoslavia en-
tered transition late due to the wars of the break up – Serbia, whose transition really 
only began in 2000, being last. The well-known European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) Transition Report tried to measure the transition process 
to a market economy using a set of indicators. In 2014 EBRD stopped measuring the 
transition process, as after a quarter of a century it was considered completed in most 
countries. The countries of the former Yugoslavia were all laggards in this transition 
process since it took them much longer to reach values that were lower than those 
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achieved by the Visegrad countries (the only exception being Croatia, and not, as one 
would expect, Slovenia). The other laggards were Romania and Bulgaria.
 The expected effect of these reforms was that they would make these economies 
more efficient and that given their lower level of development they would achieve 
growth rates that would lead to clear convergence of their GDP per capita with that 
of core EU countries, here defined as EU members before the enlargement of 2004. 
Most reports on the transition by international financial institutions find clear evi-
dence of a convergence process in GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power 
parity. However, these calculations are based on the average GDP per capita of the 28 
EU members. This means that the new member states are part of the sample and part 
of the average. If  the Eurostat database  is used  to  compare average GDP per capita 
in purchasing power parity of the EU 28 members (EU 28 = 100) in 2017,  with that of 
the 19 euro zone members as a rough proxy for the higher income countries (although 
they include the Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, Portugal, Malta, and Greece),   the 
index of the latter  is found to be  106. Of the new member states that have undergone 
transition, only the Czech Republic and Slovenia score an index above 80, while only 
Slovakia and two Baltic states have an index above 70. In short, convergence had not 
been as quick as was expected, in spite of the completed economic transition in the 
new member states and access to EU funds. All the potential candidates from the 
Western Balkans score well below 50 on the index. 
In the comparison at the countries of former Yugoslavia with the average GDP per 
capita purchasing power of the twelve richest EU countries in 2017, things look even 
worse, as presented in the Table 2.
Table 2: GDP per capita (ppp) of the states of former Yugoslavia compared to the 
average of the 12 richest EU countries 2017.
State/ Year 2017
Slovenia 71%
Croatia    51%




Source: Authors’ calculations, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
The example shows that using the richest EU states as a benchmark instead of the 
EU28 average reduces the GDP per capita in purchasing power parity of both Slo-
venia and Croatia by 11%. Using this benchmark puts them at roughly the same per-
centage point they were at in 1990, before the break-up of Yugoslavia.  To conclude, 
the economic transition aided by the EU accession process certainly did not meet the 
convergence expectations hoped for at the beginning of transition. 
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How do the new member states rate in relation to the other criteria of the degree 
of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and economic free-
dom?  The sad truth is that there has been backsliding in some of the new member 
states. The Freedom House Nations in Transition Report for 2018 (FH, 2018) labeled 
four of the eleven new member states (Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) 
as semi-consolidated democracies. Of the Western Balkan countries aspiring to be-
come EU members, Serbia and Montenegro were in the same category, while Koso-
vo, Albania, and North Macedonia were classified as hybrid regimes. In the same 
publication for 2020, Freedom House (FH, 2020) registers a turn for the worse. The 
four EU members listed as semi-consolidated democracies are Croatia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Poland. Hungary has joined the Western Balkan states, which are now 
all classified as hybrid regimes. The most disappointing fact is that the status of the 
two countries that have opened chapters in negotiations for EU membership, Serbia 
and Montenegro, has been downgraded. 
It  should be  mentioned in passing that the methodology used by Freedom House 
is hardly strict when it comes to classifying political regimes. The Economist Intel-
ligence Unit’s 2018 Democracy Index did not classify any of the new EU member 
states as full democracies (EIU, 2018). The Bertelsmann Transformation Index is 
differently constructed but has also highlighted backsliding in economic and po-
litical governance in recent years. Finally, the Varieties of Democracy index shows 
a decline in the level of democracy between 2009 and 2019 in all of the new EU 
member states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as well as in the Western Balkan 
countries that are at various stages of the EU integration process. Finally, in another 
paper (Vujačic et al., 2019) we analyzed the transition process by drawing on the 
comparative values of the World Governance indicators constructed by the World 
Bank. The values of the indicators (from 2004–2018) showed some improvement in 
the rule of law for the countries in transition, but little or no progress in the control of 
corruption or government accountability.
The question arises as to why, with all the aid from the EU in terms of funding, 
guidance, and political support, all these countries have been unable to meet the stan-
dards of Western-style democracies after a quarter of a century. Some of them have 
been full EU members for more than a decade.
The Mid-Transition Trap
There are various answers to this and other related questions. No matter how varied 
the answers may be, there is no denying that the transition countries have not met the 
set criteria,  or after having met them have regressed in terms of democracy and good 
governance. In other words, in most countries the transition process has proven to be 
either incomplete or unsustainable. 
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This points to the existence of what we term the ‘mid-transition trap’. This term 
is analogous to the ‘middle-income trap’, describing the inability of the vast majority 
of countries to reach the high-income country category after escaping from poverty 
and reaching middle-income level. There is much controversy as to the existence 
of such a ‘trap’, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, ‘mid-transition 
trap’ seems to be an appropriate term to describe countries that have completed most 
of the economic transition but have been unable to sustain political or democratic 
reforms. Thus, they have not really completed the transition to a fully fledged dem-
ocratic system in line with the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. That these 
countries are members of the EU makes this phenomena all the more disturbing. It is 
worth noting that some economic reforms have also been dismantled, but  for reasons 
of space and the focus of this paper this issue will not be addressed.
We propose that the concepts of new state capitalism and state capture are key 
in shedding light on the causes of the mid-transition trap. It is interesting to note 
that the state capture phenomenon was recognized towards the end of the first 
decade of transition. The World Bank has actually tried to measure the extent of 
this phenomenon in the transition countries. The results for transition countries 
after the first decade of transition were obtained by combining various elements of 
corporate influence – obtaining privileges through parliamentary legislation, pres-
idential decrees, central bank action, criminal and commercial courts, and party 
finance – in a composite index. The countries were divided into those with high and 
medium levels of state capture. Of the European countries in the sample, Croatia, 
Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova were in the high category, with the rest 
classified as medium. More importantly, countries with strong economic reform 
and high civil liberties clustered at low levels of state capture, which at that point in 
time were Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania 
(Hellman et al., 2000). In order to appreciate the broad accuracy of these findings it 
is important to remember the political landscape of the time (CESifo, 2011). Things 
have changed since then and the World Bank has switched to World Governance 
Indicators. 
The following table is an attempt to provide a new classification that includes the 
discussed concepts and categories of new state capitalism, crony capitalism, and state 
capture.
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Thus, the general characteristics of the transition countries (bearing in mind that 
only countries of Eastern, Central, or Southeast Europe that have joined the EU or 
are at various stages of joining are being observed) are: flawed democracies or hybrid 
regimes; a medium or low level of human rights, rule of law, and economic freedom; 
a high or medium presence of crony capitalism; and a high probability of state cap-
ture. These are certainly not very inspiring characteristics. If  democracy, human 
rights, the rule of law, and economic freedom are used as success criteria, then the 
transition process in the observed countries can hardly be called a success. Can this 
be explained by applying crony capitalism, state capture, or a combination of the two 
as key concepts of analysis?
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We believe that these concepts largely explain the existence of what we have 
termed the ‘mid-transition trap’. The problem with the concept of state capture is 
that no matter how it is defined, it is difficult to measure. There are significant in-
sights in case studies such as the seminal work of Ganev (2007) on Bulgaria. These 
case studies should be taken seriously as they provide an overview of the variety of 
this phenomenon. Some studies are broader and, more significantly, some put the 
Central European new EU member states at the center of a comparative study. Thus, 
Abbey (2014) finds two types of state capture in these countries. The first is based 
on political party monopoly (Poland, Hungary), the other on the capture of the state 
by dominant business elites (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria).  However, 
for purposes of comparative analysis a somewhat more unified and thorough meth-
odology is needed. Recently there have been some significant attempts to refine and 
significantly extend and deepen the measurement methodology used in comparative 
analysis (Stoyanov et al., 2019). Interestingly, the authors then applied this method-
ology to five EU member states, of which three were new member states (Bulgaria, 
Romania, and the Czech Republic), with the result that one of the new member states 
(Czech Republic) came out looking better in this respect than two of the core 15 EU 
states (Italy, Spain). In this study Bulgaria was ranked the worst, followed by Roma-
nia, while Italy had a worse rank than Spain.
That state capture is recognized as an important phenomenon in the EU is im-
plicitly present in the initiative to reform the EU, first proposed by French president 
Macron. Proposals for reform are scheduled to be discussed and decided on in the 
next two years. Furthermore, the French proposal to reorganize the accession meth-
odology for the Western Balkan states that are on the road to European integration is 
further proof that there is an impasse – which we have labeled here as  the mid-tran-
sition trap. Worse still, the measurement of progress in the opening chapters of the 
accession process is inversely related to the state of democracy in these countries 
(Richter & Wunsc, 2019). That the closer the countries get to the EU in terms of ne-
gotiating the accession chapters the further they get from democratic rule is certainly 
surprising, to say the least. 
All this brings some grim conclusions. The process of transition did not turn out 
to be as smooth and irreversible as was assumed. This has led to misunderstandings 
and problems in the EU itself and in its structures. Getting out of the mid-transition 
trap that a number of countries have fallen into is a fundamental challenge that faces 
both the EU itself and its strategy for further expansion. Moreover, given that the EU 
operates by consensus it is difficult to see how it can reform itself. The hollowing out 
of the basic values that the EU has stood for over the years could either undermine 
it or lead to different levels of EU integration, with some or most of the transition 
countries given a semi-peripheral status. If there is a line of thinking that points in 
this direction, the mid-transition trap will certainly have contributed to it.
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